I. i. Background
Our data are from the I 97 7-9I Personal Income Distribution Surveys, a series of cross-section data sets. The sample sizes range from about 9,700 households in the first year to i6,ooo in the later years. After dropping those households with improper values, the base data set we use for the graphical analysis consists of 229,82i households. All the regressions limit the sample to those households with heads aged 25-65, further reducing the sample to 2I2,046 households.
The information on durables is drawn from the survey's enumeration of household stocks of various items. We study nineteen goods which satisfy three criteria: they (i) are included in (almost) all the years, (ii) can reasonably be thought of as durable, and (iii) show at least some diffusion.3 These are colour televisions, refrigerators, telephones, air conditioner/heaters, electric rice cookers, electric fans, video cassette recorders (VCRs), stereo equipment,4 clothes washing machines, food mixers, electric/regular pianos, cameras, kitchen (exhaust) fans, gas stoves, microwave ovens, gas hot water heaters, automobiles, motorcycles, and computers. The questions enumerate the total number of each of these items the household owns. Here we study the initial acquisition of durables and classify a household as owning the durable if its stock is one or more.5 Table 2 (which we discuss further below), columns 4-6, reports the level of ownership in the first and last years, and the change between the two (i.e. diffusion), for those households with heads aged 25-65. Rice cookers and electric fans exhibit the lowest rates of diffusion in the fifteen years at under 5 %; colour televisions, telephones, VCRs and kitchen fans are among the highest with greater than 6o %.
Rosca information in our data is fairly limited. Though a household may participate in multiple roscas during the survey year, we only have aggregate information on (i) the total amount of money paid into a rosca since its inception if the household has not won the pot yet ('net saving'), and (ii) the total amount of money to be paid through the end of the rosca if the household has already won the pot ('net borrowing'). These two measures are reported on a recall basis for both the beginning and end of the survey year. There is very little information on the interest payments/bids. Since we are interested in rosca participation only, we count the household as participating during the survey year if any of the four rosca variables are nonzero.
3 Black and white televisions are an example of a durable which we do not analyse because during this time there is net decumulation by households. 4 We classify a household as owning stereo equipment if it owns any component, such as a record player or a compact disk player, in that year. 5 While there might be a link between acquisition of any durable and rosca participation it is in some ways cleaner to use the initial decision to acquire. If anything this will lead us to understate the importance of roscas.
Rosca Participation in Taiwan: An Overview
This section reviews some basic findings on participation in roscas, which are amplified in Levenson and Besley (I995 I984   OI20  I985  0?053  I986  0-I79   I987  o-I62  I988  O-I63  I989  O-I80   I990  0-I99  I99I  0-225 The sample size is 2I2,046.
Rosca participation is not stable through time. Table I shows a dramatic collapse in rosca participation between I983 and I985. Mao (I985, p. I4I) 6 Liu (I987) used a sample frame similar to that used to collect our data to conduct his own survey. He reported 'total' household saving (borrowing) in roscas of NT 82-7 (82-o) billion for I982. A direct comparison with the estimates from our data is not possible because Liu collected and reported information that differs from that available in the national sample we used. Liu apparently used an urban sample that consisted of only I,030 households out of the more than I 5,000 in our data. Differences in the time of year during which the data were collected or in the sampling weights used to construct national estimates may impede our ability to compare his estimates with ours. We were not able to verify whether such differences actually posed such a problem for comparison. We did, however, calculate that there was a total NT 48-I (34-7) billion saved in (borrowed from) roscas at the end of I 982, according to our data. This does not include interest earned, and does not include funds from roscas that disbanded during the year. It is still possible that our data understate the extent of participation. We were not able to verify this, however, given the lack of comparable data.
7 Table I uses the subsample consisting of those households with heads aged 25-65. This is the sample used in all following tables. The estimates in 
Durables Diffusion
The standard model of the diffusion of technical innovations posits an Sshaped, or logistic, curve for the time path of adoption (see, for example, Griliches, I957, on hybrid corn). The durables that we study are not innovations, in most cases having been available in other countries for some time. However, many of the issues raised there are pertinent for Taiwan.1" For example, diffusion could represent a gradual learning process in which adopters acquire information about household durables as they observe others purchasing them.
However, the growth of income throughout the period is most likely the primary determinant of observed diffusion as the costs of durables relative to lifetime incomes fall throughout the period. Initially we expect only the richest households to purchase a particular durable. Then, as incomes rise, households in the densely populated middle of the income distribution would be able to afford the good; until, finally, only the poorest households would not have acquired the good.
Financing constraints may also be important for lumpy investments, as individuals desire to borrow to finance purchases. As Besley et al. (I 993) show, this could lead to gradual diffusion of durables among a group of identical individuals. Capital market institutions then ration access to the good through time.
Durables diffusion in Taiwan conforms broadly to the logistic pattern. Fig.  I shows the proportion of Taiwanese households that own a given durable for a number of different items over the years of our data.12 Note that there have been dramatic changes in the composition of household durables ownership despite the short fifteen-year time span. The largest increases are for vcrs, kitchen fans, gas hot water heaters, colour televisions, telephones, air conditioner/heaters, washing machines, and cameras (see also Table 2 -Each durable was enumerated in I 977 with the exception of vcrs, microwaves and computers, which were first enumerated in I982, I984 and I983, respectively. We implicitly assume that no one owned those three durables in the years prior to their enumeration.
The number of non-owners is the total number of households that did not own the durable (i.e. those in the 'at risk' population) for all the years except the last year, since only those households that did not own as of year t-were used in calculating the conditional expectations.
The means in column seven are weighted by the number of non-owners (column two).
during the year, the other for those who do not. Fig. 2 is a nonparametric way of examining the relationship between rosca use and durable ownership, controlling for income.'3 The relationships depicted in Fig. 2 are between durables ownership and rosca participation, but inferences can also be made about durables purchases. Although the data do not distinguish ownership of durables from those purchased during the survey year, the difference in the fraction of households 13 Graphs of durable ownership by rosca participation alone (not reported) show that, in the case of almost every single durable, ownership is significantly higher among rosca participants in every year. However, there is a spurious correlation caused by income. The graphs by income decile and rosca participation show virtually no difference between rosca participants for a number of durables (computers, microwaves, and pianos); and for the rest, which show patterns similar to, though not as stark as, those in 0 1977 1978 1979 1980 1981 19821983 1984 1985 1986 1987 1988 1989 1990 1991 Year Fig. 2 (a, b) . For legend see facing page.
owning a good from one year to the next gives a reasonable indicator of acquisition rates.'4 Fig. 2 reveals that the level of ownership of each of the durables among households in the first income decile is higher for rosca participants in (almost) every year; while there is virtually no greater level of 14 We are implicitly assuming that there is little movement of individual households from one income decile to another between years. Undoubtedly there are some households whose income grows or falls more rapidly than average for their decile, thereby causing them to rise into/fall down to the adjoining income decile. However, for the society as a whole it is highly unlikely that these households make up more than a small fraction of the population. The idea is easily illustrated by means of an example. Consider ten individuals each of whom wishes to own a durable that costs $ I oo. Left to their own efforts, they might save $io per week over ten weeks. After that each individual would be able to enjoy the services of the durable. This is inefficient. After only one week, it would be possible to pool the joint savings of the ten individuals to buy one durable. Thus one (lucky) individual could enjoy its services after only a week of saving rather than having to wait for the full ten weeks. The same would be true in the second week. In fact, by the tenth week everyone would own a durable except the last individual who receives it then, precisely when he would have received it had he saved on his own. The result is a Pareto improvement -every rosca member gains over the no-trade outcome, or at least is no worse off (the case for the last person).
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The group must, however, find a means of rationing access to the durable since everyone would want to receive the $ioo pot in the first week. The two principal methods of rationing access to the pot are drawing lots (what Besley et al. call a random rosca) and bidding (a bidding rosca). The latter creates something akin to an interest rate profile as those who receive the pot early pledge to compensate those who wait by offering larger future contributions. In the hui that are studied here, bidding is normally used. In Taiwan uncommon to hear that some individuals (the relatively wealthy) join roscas with no immediate desire to purchase durables. They aim to earn interest from the premiums paid by the rosca members who win the pot early on. Suppose now that we parameterise individuals by two characteristics: Y is a measure of their income and 6 is a measure of how much they value a particular durable good. The locus in Fig. 3 illustrates the critical values of these characteristics which make individuals indifferent between acquiring and not acquiring a durable. Joining a rosca shifts this locus downwards and to the left. This implies that individuals who would not previously have found it worthwhile to buy the durable now wish to. This yields two empirical hypotheses:
Speed: Joining a rosca allows a group of individuals to speed up their acquisition of a given durable good.
Depth: The existence of roscas expands the set of individuals who choose to buy a given durable so that overall diffusion extends more deeply into the population.
The above discussion assumed no access to external sources of finance. This reflects the reality in Taiwan for many individuals who seek consumer credit.15 We also ignored default problems in the rosca. By being formed from among members of the same community (i.e. friends and relatives) or the same work place, roscas can circumvent many of the information and enforcement problems which pervade capital markets in the early stages of economic development. Roscas may also avoid government regulation.
However, not all individuals choose to save by participating in roscas. Some have good sources of capital elsewhere, for example a bank loan or an inheritance. Others do not have access to a social network in which roscas flourish. Since individuals tend to contribute fixed amounts of their incomes to the rosca pot, we would also expect to see roscas more prevalent among occupations with relatively stable income streams. Long job tenure should also be complementary with ability to enforce repayment. Both of these points underscore the finding in Levenson and Besley (I 995) of higher rosca participation in the more-secure government jobs.
Empirical Specification
Our empirical specification has two main features: (i) a functional form that permits consistency with the micro data, even though the estimation is conducted on grouped data; and (ii) a fairly flexible relationship between age and the characteristics of durables' purchasers.
Consider the decision of household i to buy a durable good for the first time, assuming a unit demand. We represent this by the household's hazard function, denoted by Ai (t), which gives the probability that it decides to purchase the 15 In some countries such as Taiwan, the government has biased financial sector development towards the industrial and away from the consumption sector in the belief that this better promotes long run economic development. The hypotheses that we claimed above are captured by c > o. 17 We do not have panel data. Hence, we estimate the model on birth cohorts, constructed from the time-series of cross-sections; where the 'age' of the household is assumed to be the age of the household head. In doing so we replace the individual household level variables Xit and rit in (2) by cohort means, Xct and rCV conditional on not owning the durable at the beginning of period t. Similarly, we replace Ai(t) by AC(t), which is the fraction of the cohort that own the durable during period t (a year in our data) conditional on not owning it at the end of period t-i. Since the number of people sampled from each birth cohort varies from year to year, our estimate of AC(t) is calculated as: Ac(t) = ownct/tot, -ownct-l/totct-3 where ownct is the number of sample households in the birth cohort that own the durable at time t, totct is the total number of households sampled from the cohort at time t, and notct-i is the number of sample households that do not own the durable at time t-i. We will use lower case notation (own, tot and not) to 
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Note that the way we have defined A means that ac can be interpreted as the contribution of rosca participation to the net difference in the rate at which the durable is accumulated. Our data do not permit direct estimation of (4). In theory, the variables in Xct should be the mean characteristics of the subset of households that had not purchased the durable prior to time t. We only actually observe whether a household owns the durable at the year's end. Hence, we use Xct-1, the average characteristics of the cohort members who did not own the durable at the end of period t-i. The main drawback with this is the fact that contemporaneous shocks to household characteristics will not be properly represented.
We also do not measure rct directly either. We know who participates in a rosca in period t, but not who among this group did not own the durable when the year began. However, in this case, even if we were able to observe this variable, there would be a question about including it uninstrumented in the regression due to the potential endogeneity of the decision to join a rosca; i.e. individuals may choose to join a rosca because they desire to purchase certain durable goods. Consequently we used rct-1, mean rosca participation among those who do not own the durable in the previous period, as the regressor. Since even this measure of participation may still be endogenous to the decision to purchase a durable -the household might have to join the rosca at time t-I to ensure it has a good chance of winning the pot by time t -we also tried an instrumental variables specification detailed below.
To estimate AO (t), first note that if a typical household in each cohort were formed at the same age, then we could estimate AO(t) non-parametrically by including a set of age dummies in (4). However this may be too restrictive because there are systematic differences in age at first marriage between cohorts of different generations. To capture this we also include a set of cohort dummy variables. Fin'ally, we allow the baseline hazard to depend upon macroeconomic variables, specifically, GDP growth, the interest rate on time deposits and the inflation rate. With the possible exception of the interest rate, we cannot offer a good structural interpretation of why these should be important. However, our aim is to capture the effect of macroeconomic shocks that might influence the durables purchase decision that are not captured in the period t-cohort characteristics that we include.
Substituting the age and cohort variables into (4), the basic equation to be estimated is thus Note also that (i) tends to be true if either the durable has diffused throughout the whole population (as in the case of gas stoves in our data), or if the diffusion path is relatively flat (as with pianos). Equation (5) does not deal with our concern about the endogeneity of rosca participation. If individuals chose to join a rosca when they anticipate buying a durable, then we would find a positive association between rosca participation and durables accumulation in an equation such as (5). However, the causation would run in reverse, from durables acquisition to rosca participation. This is quite consistent with the theory. However, we could not rule out force of habit, custom or tradition driving rosca participation rather than desire to speed up capital accumulation. To provide convincing evidence that roscas produce faster and deeper diffusion we need to demonstrate a link between access to roscas and durables accumulation, thus measuring how making roscas available to otherwise excluded individuals would increase capital accumulation. Ideally, therefore, we need some variable that predicts rosca participation but can be excluded from the accumulation equation. Here, we experiment with using occupation in this way. This is valid if tastes for durables' acquisition are distributed independently of occupational choice. We also used twice-lagged cohort rosca participation (among the households that did not own the durable) as an instrument.
Cohort Formation
To estimate (5) using our data we restricted the analysis to those households with heads aged 25-65. Younger household heads are excluded because they are under counted in the data, due to military service and college attendance. Older household heads are excluded because they are potentially subject to sample selection bias. The household head in our data is defined as the person who makes the most money; thus when older parents retire their households might 'disappear' from the cohort as their incomes drop or they move in with their working children. For further discussion see Levenson (I993).
Summary statistics from the cohort data are contained in Table 2 . The durables are arranged in increasing order of aggregate diffusion, from top to bottom. As indicated in column i not all the durables are enumerated in each year of the survey. In I99I, rice cookers, electric fans and gas stoves were dropped from the survey. Similarly, vcrs, microwaves and computers were added to the survey in I982, I984 and I983, respectively. The number of cohort/year observations is in column 3, and the number of households used to calculate the cohort means (1,,t nott-1) is in column 2. The last column contains the mean and standard deviation of AC(t), the fraction of the cohort ('at risk') that acquires the durable.
I I I. RESULTS
The results from running (5) for each of the nineteen durable goods are reported in Table 3 . In the first column we report a, the effect of rosca participation on the rate of accumulation. The durables are arranged, as in The results give reasonable support to the view that there is a positive association between rosca participation and durable goods acquisition for these data. The results reveal that almost every coefficient is positive. Moreover, the coefficients are significant at better than 5 O for around half the durables and about one-third are significant at I %. Among those that are significant, rosca participation is associated with faster durables accumulation on the order of 6-45 s . Taken together, the table provides some encouragement to the view that there is a positive relationship between rosca participation in a cohort and the decision to acquire durables. Of particular note is the positive coefficient for the acquisition of automobiles which, at the very least, is consonant with anecdotal accounts.
The evidence is not an artifact of the specification adopted here. This kind of guardedly positive evidence, i.e. mostly positive coefficients, many of which are significant at better than a 500 level of confidence, is characteristic of almost every specification that we have tried. More encouraging still, we have not been able to find sensible specifications in which we observe negative and significant coefficients on the rosca participation variable.
We also pursued a slightly different approach which uses the dramatic fall in rosca participation in the years I983-5 (Table i) 2-02* 0o049 400 * Significant at 5 * * significant at i The dependent variable is the within-cohort increase in the rate of ownership of the durable good. The standard errors have been corrected for arbitrary forms of heteroskedasticity. Each regression contains a constant; GDP growth; time deposits interest rate; consumer price inflation; and controls for whether the household head is a mainlander, the number of other income earners in the household who are mainlanders, total household income, the number of children, the number of adults, and the occupation of both the household head and other household members.
Our theory predicts that this should lead to a fall in durables acquisition ceteris parnbus. To test this, we replaced the cohort level rosca participation variable with a dummy variable for the years I 983-5. The results are reported in Table  4 . The predicted negative effect shows up in all the cases in which the rosca variable showed up as significant in Table 3 , and is significant for most. It is, of course, crucial that there is no omitted macroeconomic variable which drives both the fall in rosca participation and durables accumulation during these critical three years. In pursuit of this, we augmented the set of macroeconomic variables with a number of leading indicators of Taiwan's macroeconomic performance without affecting the reported results. Thus, the idea that the period I 983-5 is special principally because of the decline in rosca participation during these years seems reasonable.
Our final specification attempts to deal with the issue of endogeneity. The results that instrument rosca participation with a set of occupational dummies and twice-lagged rosca participation are presented in Table 5 . While there is no question that this weakens our results somewhat, there is still a good deal of consistency between these and the uninstrumented results. There are positive been better appreciated. Our study presents preliminary evidence on the importance of informal finance, even in an economy that has undergone significant modernisation. Taiwan is now a middle income country which has many modern institutions and a relatively wealthy population. Even so, the use of informal finance remains quite strong. This is a reminder that some institutions may take more time to build than others, and that a banking system which serves the needs of the whole population cannot be created instantly. Roscas are observed frequently even in developed countries where access to capital markets may be limited for some groups. Overall, our analysis underlines the notion that the informal sector can be productive. In this case it permits individuals to reap gains from intertemporal trade, which leads to increased capital acumulation. This may have some important implications for a number of discussions concerning the design of development policy.
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